This study aims at establishing a ranking of agricultural cooperatives based on financial economic indicators and the relationship with attributes of corporate governance. The sample is composed of 25 agricultural cooperatives. Data collection 216
Introduction
Nowadays, it is pertinent to use The Theory of Games applied in studies of cooperative societies. This fact has been coming true since these societies are beginning to address more carefully the issues that for some time concerned business corporations, which are: the conflict arising from the separation of ownership and management, which, in turn, creates a problem regarding monitoring the relationship between members and administrators [1] . The competition and the emphasis on finding efficient and satisfactory results have led cooperatives directors to question the adequacy of corporate governance structure [2] .
In addition, the cooperative management model has been receiving criticism for the shortcomings that undermine the competitiveness, mainly due to the inefficiency of the administration which endangers the survival and organizational efficiency. Among the problems which were pointed out, there is also the lack of experience of board directors, i.e., lack of professionalization [3] . These facts expose the usefulness of the Theory of Games to define a ranking of cooperatives that present a better performance based on their financial economic indicators.
Based on the above considerations, the following research question has emerged: what is the ranking of agricultural cooperatives taking in consideration financial economic indicators and the relationship with corporate governance attributes? Therefore, this study aims at establishing this ranking of agricultural cooperatives taking in consideration financial economic indicators and the relationship with the attributes of corporate governance.
Theory of Games
A game is considered when there are situations in which players make strategic decisions that are used to define the payoffs of the players. Payoffs are values associated with possible results, namely, a company establishes a price and, as a consequence, the payoffs are the profits [4] .
Financial economic performance ranking

217
Considering the elements and rules for the conduction of a game, the theory assumes that a game is only played once. However, [5] defines that this does not eliminate the possibility of a game repetition by a finite or an infinite number of times. It is important, then, to define the concept of cooperative and noncooperative games. In cooperative games, the difference of the same game being played n times and that there are games with n independent repetitions is not relevant, but it is, at the same time, essential in non-cooperative games [5] . In noncooperative games with a variable sum, the players have the possibility of signaling a desire, and the other players must do the same [5] .
The search for joint maximization of results by players is characterized as a cooperated game [6] . According to [7] , in cooperative games, the benefits are shared to encourage cooperation between players. On the other hand, in uncooperative games, each player seeks to maximize its own result and there is no cooperation [6] . [5] argues that, in zero-sum games, one player's gain implies another player's loss. In a two people zero-sum game, it is assumed that the positive result for a player implies a negative result for the opponent [8] . Finally, it is understood that games are set strategies adopted by players, which are also called complete game plan.
For each game, players have a set of options that are called pure strategies [8] . On the other hand, when the saddle point is not found, mixed strategies are adopted, where one player, instead of choosing a strategy, transfers the decision to a lottery device, with a probability associated with each pure strategy [5] . Finally, the Theory of Games can be used to establish rankings based on financial economic indicators.
Financial Economic Performance
The levels of analysis involve methods, calculations, and interpretations that help understand, analyze and monitor the organization performance. The income statement and balance sheet are the fundamental demonstrations of the development of indicators [10] . In this study, the performance of agricultural cooperatives societies will be measured in three groups of indicators: capital structure, liquidity, and profitability.
The capital structure exposes the broad financial decision lines, in terms of obtaining and applying resources. This group is formed by the following indicators: participation of third party capital; composition of the debt; immobilization of equity; and immobilization of non-current assets [11] . As for the liquidity indicators, Marion (2007) cites the ability to use them when assessing the payment capacity taking into account the long-term, short-term or immediate term. Finally, [13] comments that the profitability indicators are used to measure the ability of companies to produce income from the capital invested, either being third-party capital or equity.
Attributes of Corporate Governance in Cooperative Societies
Corporate governance emphasizes balance and strength that regulates power among interest groups, owners, managers, employees, government and the general public [14] . In European countries and in developed economies like the United States and the Netherlands, corporate governance practices of cooperatives promote the disassociation of the management cooperatives, where in most cases there is a professional management board [2] . In Brazil, most cooperatives concentrate ownership and management decision, i.e., they do not promote the separation of ownership, control and decision [15] . The configuration that establishes the separation of ownership and control in cooperatives is the existence of a board of directors elected by the members to perform the control decisions, and the executive board is hired to perform management [16] .
It can impair the performance of the cooperative if one member, while elected to the board of directors, exercises control decisions and management simultaneously, without a hired executive board [15] . [17] adds that incentives to the efforts of the executives will be greater if they are hired by the cooperative since the internal incentives are low.
To [18] the management board has an important influence on the performance of the cooperative, by monitoring the actions of the management and executive boards. Thus, a comprehensively distributed management board and with a number of members that is consistent with the size of the cooperative can be an important corporate governance attribute [2] . [19] comments that the equity holder members of the cooperatives tend to be the focus of research regarding governance. Thus, the participation of a larger number of members can influence board members to exercise the management and control activities in a more efficient way [19] . A larger number of members provide power at general meetings and greater involvement of elected members with the presentation better results [20] . [21] use the number of cooperative members as a proxy to represent the separation between ownership and control.
Related Studies
It is possible to find many papers which address different dimensions to corporate governance and performance of cooperative societies. [22] addressed the corporate governance practices in a cooperative in the state of Santa Catarina, Brazil. The results indicate that the transparency of the administrative management is shared at the annual general meeting. The findings show that from 50 investigated aspects intrinsic to 5 subjects (professionalization, associates, board of directors, management and audit committee) Cooper Alfa complies with 34 actions related to corporate governance.
[23] discussed aspects related to the internal structure and strategic behavior of dairy cooperatives in relation to globalization. The results suggested that the consolidation through mergers and acquisitions, forming strategic alliances, adopting a professional system and corporate governance are necessary conditions for strengthening the cooperative system in this market. [15] identified the need to measure the separation between ownership and management decision in Brazilian agricultural cooperatives. The results showed that there is a group of them adopting models with partial separation between ownership and management.
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Methodological Procedures
The research population is made up of 90 agricultural cooperatives from the South region of Brazil, registered in Cooperative Organizations. The population was designed taking into consideration the cooperatives that disposed their 2013 management reports for download on the website. The sample was composed by cooperatives that had all the information for the operationalization of 6 cooperatives registered in OCESC, 14 registered in OCEPAR, and 5 registered in OCERGS.
For the data analysis and preparation of the ranking, a set of financial economic indicators was used, as presented in Table 1 . This set of indicators was used in order to provide tools for the research and to build a ranking which would evidence the performance of the cooperatives. [9] organized the ranking of a set of companies in which the mixed strategies were used for accounting positioning. This version has dealt with scalar games. Thus, a mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution on the set of their pure strategies. Typically a player has n pure strategies. A mixed strategy for this player is a nupla = ( 1 , 2 , … , ) so that ∑ = 1
=1
, 0 ≤ ≤ 1 , where indicates the probability with which the player will select the ith pure strategy. In this article, cooperatives comprise the options of player I and the indicators comprise the options of player II. The companies ranking (primal) and its indicators for scalar games were developed by [9] . The developed analysis is included in the scalar matrix games, in which the payments received by the players are represented by real numbers. The model is presented in the form below: Max = Subjected to: The results of the applied model in the form of linear programming problems (LPPs) are presented in the description and data analysis section. The generated ranking is compared with the corporate governance attributes observed in the investigated cooperatives. Table 2 shows the categorization of corporate governance attributes for cooperative used in this study. Number of member Composition of the members who are part of the cooperative Number of members [19] ; [20] Source: Research data.
In Table 2 , it can be observed that for cooperatives that present separation of ownership and control it has been assigned the number 1, and for those who did not, it has been assigned number 0. The board size was categorized by the number of effective members and the number of cooperative members by the number of cooperative members that are part of the cooperative. As an additional test, the logistic regression was used to determine which of the financial performance indicators Financial economic performance ranking 221 used to establish the performance ranking of the cooperatives performance may have had explanatory factors of the governance attributes. Table 2 presents the accounting positioning ranking generated on the basis of financial economic indicators by applying the model in the form of linear programming problem (LPP's) and the possible association with the attributes of corporate governance. Based on these ranking positions, the evidence indicates that among the 10 cooperative with the worst placements, only 2 (COASUL, COOPERITAIPU) have separation of ownership and control. So, it is possible to say that 80% of the cooperatives with the worse performance indicators have the governance attribute where there is no separation between ownership and control. On the other hand, most of the cooperatives which were better positioned in the ranking showed separation between ownership and control.
Results Analysis
The results show that the financial economic performance is related to the separation between ownership and control governance attribute, corroborating [1] who state that the management and control of a cooperative when exercised only by the elected members in a general meeting may harm the interest of the community through an unsatisfactory economic performance. In addition, the inference posed by [15] that argues that management and control of a cooperative exercised only by the management board elected in a meeting can become impoverished and can impair performance is confirmed with the indicated results. Table 2 shows the performance indicators that have influenced the corporate governance attribute of separation between ownership and control. The model shown in Table 4 explains 62.6% of the variations registered in the dependent variable of the attribute separation between ownership and control. Overall, the results confirm that the best financial economic performance can be an explaining factor of the separation between ownership and control exercised by Financial economic performance ranking 223 cooperatives, where the higher PARTCTERC, the higher LIQGER and the higher ROE were preponderant in cooperatives with separation between ownership and control.
This finding deserves attention since the cooperatives management is concerned with the performance of the equity, in which the net profits bring private benefits to members, so the return on equity should be highlighted in such organizations. However, the return on assets is not a priority factor for the management of such organizations, as it does not bring private benefits to members, which is the social interest of these organizations.
Conclusions
It can be concluded that among the 10 cooperatives which presented the best financial economic performance, 80% have the separation between ownership and control attribute. Therefore, it is suggested that there is a relation between the best performance and the separation between ownership and control. Similarly, to confirm the results 80% among the 10 cooperatives with the worst placement in the ranking do not have separation between ownership and control. Thus, it is concluded that the cooperatives with the worst indicators of financial economic performance tend to not separate the property from the control.
The result was confirmed with the application of the binomial logistic regression, where the highest indicators of financial economic performance (PARTCTERC, LIQGER and ROE) were presented as explanatory factors to the level of 10% of the existence of separation between ownership and control in the management of the researched cooperatives. It is concluded that the cooperatives management has its focus linked to the private benefit of the members, where net profits for the period are factors of interest, not prioritizing the effective management of return on assets.
